the writing will be about Read Combs Ch 6. Only referanss is the chapter. I suggest using a three-ring binder to store your journal entries after they have been read and graded. Each journal entry should contain several paragraphs, written in your own words, and should conform with the following format:Journal FormatAuthor ______________________ Reading Title ________________________Your Name ___________________ Date ______________________________ SummaryWrite from memory, noting what you recall as the main ideas of the reading.IntegrationIn your own words, how does this reading “connect” (amplify, contradict, substantiate, etc.) to other information about this topic? The other information may be in the form of other readings, news stories, or images of the police portrayed in popular culture.What do you see as the implications of the ideas covered in the reading?ApplicationHow can you use the information in this reading?Does the reading change your view of some aspect of policing? Explain.If you think there is no application for the material, say so. However, provide a rationale for your position.Evaluation Describe your reaction to the reading (like, dislike, etc.). Why?Who is the appropriate audience for this reading? Why?What would make the reading more useful?5. Essay questionCreate an essay question based on the reading that requires critical thinking (comparing, analyzing, evaluating, critiquing, justifying, etc.). The question should be capable of being answered by someone who has read this and earlier readings in our class.STRET WORD , DIRECTE STYLE , YOUR ONLY REFERENSS IS THE CHAPTER 6 .
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Chapter 6 Violence in the Name of the Faith Religious
Opening Viewpoint: The Journey of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Religious extremism is a central attribute of the New Terrorism. It has become a binding ideology for many
extremists, in part because it provides an uncomplicated sense of purpose and a clear worldview. But how do
individuals come to adopt religious revolution as their primary purpose in life? What kind of personal journey leads
them to view the world through the lens of religious intolerance?
The case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is an important study of how young Muslims turn to jihad. During the U.S.-led
occupation of Iraq after the invasion of March 2003, al-Zarqawi became a primary symbol of Islamist resistance. His
likeness and name became as well known as Osama bin Laden’s, and he became synonymous with the type of
adversary the United States expected to fight in the war on terrorism. Al-Zarqawi’s ideology encompassed a fervent
internationalism, believing that all Muslim-populated countries should be governed in accordance with Islamic law
and that jihad must be waged to protect the faith.
Born Ahmed Khalayleh in the Jordanian town of Zarqa (from which he adopted his name), al-Zarqawi was a young
man who lived a fast and nonreligious life during his early years. He fought, drank alcohol, was heavily tattooed,
dropped out of high school, and had a reputation for being incorrigible. However, he joined many other young men
by volunteering to serve as a fighter in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. It was during this
service that al-Zarqawi began to become deeply religious by immersing himself in reading the Qur’an and accepting
the worldview that the “Muslim nation” should be defended from nonbelievers. As was the case with many who
served in Afghanistan, he returned home in 1992 with a global religious outlook.
In Jordan, al-Zarqawi became a follower of the radical cleric Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian who
advocated the overthrow of all secular governments. Because of his association with al-Maqdisi, al-Zarqawi and
other followers were jailed as political prisoners. During several years in prison, al-Zarqawi stood out as a
temperamental leader who eventually eclipsed his mentor al-Maqdisi. He became a radical among radicals, arguably
more extremist in his ideology than Osama bin Laden. To al-Zarqawi, all who did not share his interpretation of
Islam were unbelievers and therefore enemies—even Shi’a Muslims.
After his release from prison in Jordan, he apparently drifted to Pakistan and then Afghanistan, where he allegedly
had poor relations with Al-Qa’ida. Sometime around the time of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi
made his way to Iraq and eventually became a major symbol of Sunni Islamist resistance to the occupation. As a
result, Osama bin Laden apparently solicited al-Zarqawi to put aside their differences, and they declared alZarqawi’s movement to be Al-Qa’ida Organization for Holy War in Iraq. This movement became an archetype
for later Sunni Islamist movements such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).
In July 2005, al-Zarqawi announced on behalf of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq that the organization would wage war against
members of the Iraqi armed forces because they were “apostates,” as well as against the Badr Brigade (formally
known as the Badr Organization), a powerful Shi’a militia.b Despite a massive manhunt in Iraq and a $25 million
bounty, al-Zarqawi managed to elude American forces until June 2006, when he was killed by an American air
strike in a farmhouse near Baqubah.c Surviving core operatives of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq allied themselves with other
Islamist organizations and were reconstituted as the Islamic State of Iraq, the predecessor to ISIS.
a. The ISIS designation is derived from either the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and
b. See Reuters. “Zarqawi Says Qaeda Forms Wing to Fight Shi’ites—Web.” New York Times, July 5, 2005.
c. See Allen, Mike, and James Carney. “Funeral for Evil.” Time, June 19, 2006. See also Powell, Bill, and Scott
MacLeod. “How They Killed Him.” Time, June 19, 2006.
Terrorism in the name of religion has become the predominant model for political violence in the
modern world. This is not to suggest that it is the only model, because nationalism and ideology
remain as potent catalysts for extremist behavior. However, religious extremism has become a
central issue for the global community.
In the modern era, religious terrorism has increased in its frequency, scale of violence, and global
reach. At the same time, a relative decline has occurred in secular—nonreligious—terrorism. The
old ideologies of class conflict, anticolonial liberation, and secular nationalism have been
challenged by a new and vigorous infusion of sectarian (religious) ideologies. Grassroots
extremist support for religious violence has been most widespread among populations living in
repressive societies that do not permit demands for political reform or other expressions of
dissent. In this regard,
it is perhaps not surprising that religion should become a far more popular motivation for
terrorism in the post–Cold War era as old ideologies lie discredited by the collapse of the Soviet
Union and communist ideology, while the promise of munificent benefits from the liberaldemocratic, capitalist state . . . fails to materialize in many countries throughout the world.1
What is religious terrorism? What are its fundamental attributes? How is religion-inspired
violence rationalized? Religious terrorism is a type of political violence that is motivated by an
absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned—and commanded—the application of
terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts that are committed in the name of the
faith will be forgiven by the otherworldly power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence,
one’s religious faith legitimizes political violence so long as such violence is an expression of the
will of one’s deity.
Photo 6.1 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. From a video of the Jordanian-born leader of Al-Qa’ida in
Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was accused of leading a campaign of kidnappings and beheadings of foreign
workers as well as for scores of bombings that killed hundreds of Shi’as and U.S. forces. He was
killed in a U.S. air strike in June 2006. His remnant organization and other groups reformed as
the Islamic State of Iraq, the forerunner of ISIS.
Handout/Getty Images News/Getty Images
Table 6.1 presents a model that compares the fundamental characteristics of religious and secular
terrorism. The discussion in this chapter will review the following:
Primary and Secondary Motives: The Idiosyncratic Quality of Religious Terrorism
Historical Cases in Point: Fighting, Dying, and Killing in the Name of the Faith
State-Sponsored Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era
Dissident Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era
The Future of Religious Terrorism
Source: Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 94–95.
a. Communal terrorism is rarely constrained and is a case in point of convergence in the quality
of violence used by religious and secular terrorism.
Primary and Secondary Motives: The Idiosyncratic Quality
of Religious Terrorism
Religious terrorism is an idiosyncratic type of terrorism; it originates from countless national,
cultural, and historical contexts. Unlike secular terrorism, which usually has an inherent (but
fringe) rationality, religious terrorism is often an expression of unquestioned faith in a
supernatural purpose. It is, therefore, very much contingent on trends within specific religions,
the historical experiences of ethnonational groups, and the unique political environments of
nations. As a basis for terrorism, religious faith has been applied in different ways, depending on
the cultural and political environments of each terrorist movement. In some environments,
religion is the primary motive for terrorist behavior. In other contexts, it is a secondary motive
that is part of an overarching cultural identity for politically violent movements.
As a primary motive, religion is at the very core of an extremist group’s political, social, and
revolutionary agenda. Within this context, the religious belief system is the driving force behind
the group’s behavior. Examples of this profile are found in the Middle East and elsewhere
among jihadi Islamic fundamentalists, in India among Hindu extremists, and in the United States
among violent Christian antiabortionists. In the United States, the Army of God has expressed
support for and advocated violent attacks against abortion clinics and providers. The following
quotation is an excerpt from a declaration in an early edition of “The Army of God Manual”:2
We, the remnant of God-fearing men and women of the United States of Amerika [sic], do
officially declare war on the entire child-killing industry. After praying, fasting, and making
continual supplication to God for your pagan, heathen, infidel souls, we then peacefully,
passively presented our bodies in front of your death camps, begging you to stop the mass
murder of infants. . . . Yet you mocked God and continued the holocaust. . . . No longer! All of
the options have expired. Our Most Dread Sovereign Lord God requires that whosoever sheds
man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed . . . we are forced to take arms against you. . . . You
shall not be tortured at our hands. Vengeance belongs to God only. However, execution is rarely
As a secondary motive, religion represents one aspect of an extremist group’s overall identity
and agenda. For many ethnonationalist and other revolutionary movements, national
independence or some other degree of autonomy forms the primary motivation for their violent
behavior. Religious affiliation can be important because it is an element of their ethnic or
national identity, but their ultimate goal is grounded in their secular identity. Examples of this
profile are found in Northern Ireland among Catholic and Protestant terrorists, in southern Sudan
among Christians and believers in traditional faiths, and in pre-independence Palestine among
Jewish terrorists. In Palestine, the Jewish terrorist group Lohmey Heruth Israel (Fighters for the
Freedom of Israel)—commonly known as the Stern Gang—issued the following (mostly
nationalistic) rationalization for the group’s violence against the British occupation of Palestine:
Now this is the law of our war. So long as there is fear in the heart of any Jew in the world, so
long as there are embers burning under our feet anywhere in the world, so long as there is a
foreign policeman guarding the gates of our homeland, so long as there is a foreign master over
our country, so long as we do not rule our own land, so long shall we be in your way. You will
look around you and fear day and night.3
It should be understood that the concept of primary vis-à-vis secondary motives is not
exclusively an attribute of religious extremism but also exists among secular extremist groups.
For example, Marxism has been applied in different ways, depending on the political
environment of each extremist movement. Ideological groups such as Italy’s Red Brigade were
motivated primarily by Marxist ideals during the 1970s and 1980s, but nationalist movements
such as Vietnam’s Viet Cong were motivated secondarily by Marxist ideology during the 1960s
and 1970s—the Viet Cong’s primary motivation was its national identity.
Understanding Jihad as a Primary Religious Motive: An
Observation and Caveat
Keeping the idiosyncratic quality of religious terrorism in mind, it is arguably necessary to make
a sensitive observation—and caveat—about the study of religious terrorism in the modern era.
The observation is that in the modern era, the incidence of religious terrorism is
disproportionately committed by radical Islamists:
Popular Western perception equates radical Islam with terrorism. . . . There is, of course, no
Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism; it exists and leads to acts of
violence in the United States, India, Israel, and many other countries. But the frequency of
Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking. . . . A discussion of religion-inspired
terrorism cannot possibly confine itself to radical Islam, but it has to take into account the
Muslim countries’ preeminent position in this field.4
The caveat is that there is much misunderstanding in the West about the historical and cultural
origins of the growth of radical interpretations of Islam. One such misunderstanding is the
common belief that the concept of “holy war” is an underlying principle of the Islamic
faith. Another misunderstanding is that Muslims are united in supporting jihad. This is simplistic
and fundamentally incorrect. Although the term jihadis widely presumed in the West to refer
exclusively to waging war against nonbelievers, an Islamic jihad is not the equivalent of a
Christian Crusade (the Crusades are discussed later in this chapter). In this regard,
most Muslims, even most fundamentalists, are not terrorists. Instead, they have overwhelmingly
been the victims of violent conflicts. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were killed in the war
between Iran and Iraq, and the civil wars in Afghanistan and Algeria led to similarly horrific
numbers of casualties. Noncombatant Muslims have suffered untold losses in the war between
Chechnya and Russia, in the turmoil in Indonesia, and throughout much of Africa and the Middle
Chapter Perspective 6.1 provides some clarification of the concept of jihad.
Chapter Perspective 6.1 Jihad: Struggling in the Way of God
The concept of jihad is a central tenet in Islam. Contrary to misinterpretations common in the West, the term
literally means a sacred “struggle” or “effort” rather than an armed conflict or fanatical holy war.a Although
a jihad can certainly be manifested as a holy war, it more correctly refers to the duty of Muslims to personally strive
“in the way of God.”b
This is the primary meaning of the term as used in the Qur’an, which refers to an internal effort to reform bad habits
in the Islamic community or within the individual Muslim. The term is also used more specifically to denote a war
waged in the service of religion.c
Regarding how one should wage jihad,
the greater jihad refers to the struggle each person has within himself or herself to do what is right. Because of
human pride, selfishness, and sinfulness, people of faith must constantly wrestle with themselves and strive to do
what is right and good. The lesser jihad involves the outward defense of Islam. Muslims should be prepared to
defend Islam, including military defense, when the community of faith is under attack.d [emphasis added]
Thus, waging an Islamic jihad is not the same as waging a Christian Crusade—it has a broader and more intricate
meaning. Nevertheless, it is permissible—and even a duty—to wage war to defend the faith against aggressors.
Under this type of jihad, warfare is conceptually defensive in nature; in contrast, the Christian Crusades were
conceptually offensive in nature. Those who engage in armed jihad are known as mujahideen, or holy
warriors. Mujahideen who receive “martyrdom” by being killed in the name of the faith will find that “awaiting
them in paradise are rivers of milk and honey, and beautiful young women. Those entering paradise are eventually
reunited with their families and as martyrs stand in front of God as innocent as a newborn baby.”e
The precipitating causes for the modern resurgence of the armed and radical jihadi movement are twofold: the
revolutionary ideals and ideology of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the practical application of jihad against the
Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan.
Some radical Muslim clerics and scholars have concluded that the Afghan jihad brought God’s judgment against the
Soviet Union, leading to the collapse of its empire. As a consequence, radical jihadis fervently believe that they are
fighting in the name of an inexorable force that will end in total victory and guarantee them a place in paradise.
From their perspective, their war is a just war.f
a. Armstrong, Karen. Islam: A Short History. New York: Modern Library, 2000, p. 201.
b. Burke, Josh, and James Norton. “Q&A: Islamic Fundamentalism: A World-Renowned Scholar Explains Key
Points of Islam.” Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 2001.
c. Armstrong, Islam, p. 201.
d. Burke and Norton, “Q&A.”
e. Laqueur, Walter. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999, p. 100.
f. See Goldstein, Evan R. “How Just Is Islam’s Just-War Tradition?” The Chronicle Review, April 18, 2008.
A Case of Secondary Religious Motive: The Protocols of the
Learned Elders of Zion
Extremist religious and secular ideologies have historically scapegoated undesirable groups.
Many conspiracy theories have been invented to denigrate these groups and to implicate them in
nefarious plans to destroy an existing order. Some of these conspiracy theories possess quasireligious elements that in effect classify the scapegoated group as being in opposition to a natural
and sacred order.
Among right-wing nationalists and racists, there often exists a convergence between
scapegoating and mysticism. Just as it is common for rightists to assert their natural and sacred
superiority, it is also normal for them to demonize a scapegoated group, essentially declaring that
the entire group is inherently evil. One quasi-religious conspiracy theory is the promulgation of a
document titled The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.6
The Protocols originated in czarist Russia and were allegedly the true proceedings of a meeting
of a mysterious committee of the Jewish faith, during which a plot to rule the world was
hatched—in league with the Freemasons. The Protocols are a detailed record of this alleged
conspiracy for world domination, but they were, in fact, a forgery written by the secret police
(Okhrana) of Czar Nicholas II around 1895 and later published by a Russian professor named
Sergei Nilus. Many anti-Semitic groups have used this document to justify the repression of
European Jews, and it was an ideological foundation for the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in
Europe, including massacres and pogroms (violent anti-Jewish campaigns in Eastern Europe).
The National Socialist (Nazi) movement and Adolf Hitler used the Protocols extensively.
Modern Eurocentric neo-Nazis, Middle Eastern extremists (both secular and religious), and
Christian extremists continue to publish and circulate the Protocols as anti-Semitic propaganda.
In this regard, neo-Nazis and Middle Eastern extremists have found common cause in quasireligious anti-Semitism. In 1993, a Russian court formally ruled that the Protocols are a
forgery.7 Nevertheless, the document continues to be referenced by anti-Semitic and other
extremists as a historical document.
Historical Cases in Point: Fighting, Dying, and Killing in the
Name of the Faith
Terrorism carried out in the name of the faith has long been a feature of human affairs. The
histories of people, civilizations, nations, and empires are replete with examples of extremist
“true believers” who engage in violence to promote their particular belief system. Some religious
terrorists are inspired by defensive motives, others seek to ensure the predominance of their faith,
and others are motivated by an aggressive amalgam of these tendencies.
Why do some movements and ethnonational groups link their political cause to an underlying
spiritual principle? Is it accurate to characterize all spiritua …
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