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Hello, I need an answer to the question. using the given sources. Also I will update you in 12 hours for a reply to another post.1. Write an initial post (maximum 100 words) that makes a concise observation or point on the basis of one or more of the readings.2. Respond to another colleague’s post. Do not simply state that you agree or like the post–it must be a substantive comment (maximum 75 words)How did people experience the rise of nationalist and Arab nationalist politics in the 1950s and 1960s? Were there visions of political community other than nationalism? Why did they not succeed? How did the Cold War affect post-colonial politics in the Middle East?using: Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Chs. 15-16 and/or Burke/Yaghoubian, Struggle and Survival, Chs. 14 and/or Akram Khater, Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East (text by Hasan al-Banna, pp. 136-141)


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L. G E L V I N
The Modern Middle East
A H istory
University o f California, Los Angeles
New York
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Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
ISBN: 978-0-19-976605-5
Printing number: 9 8 7 6 5
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
x iii
I n t r o d u c t io n : 9/11 in Historical Perspective
Pa r t I
t h e a d v en t of t h e m o d ern a g e
Chapter 1
From Late Antiquity to the
Dawn of a New Age 13
Chapter 2
Gunpowder Empires
Chapter 3
The Middle East and the Modem World System
Chapter 4
War, Diplomacy, and the New Global
Balance of Power 45
Documents 58
Evliya Chelebi: Seyahataname (1) 58
Evliya Chelebi: Seyahatanami (2) 59
Draft Treaty o f Amity and Commerce between the Ottoman
Empire and France, February 1535 60
The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia
and the East-Indies (1) 61
The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and
the East-Indies (2) 64
Suggested Readings 66
Part II
Chapter 5
Defensive Developmentalism
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Wasif Jawhariyyeh and the Great
Nineteenth-Century Transformation
Photo Essay: The Great Nineteenth-Century
Transformation and its Aftermath 110
Chapter 8
The Life o f the Mind
Chapter 9
Secularism and Modernity
Chapter 10
Documents 158
Commercial Convention (Balta Liman): Britain and
the Ottoman Empire 158
The Hatt-i Sharif o f Gulhane 159
The Islahat Fermani 161
The d’A rcy Oil Concession 164
Algeria: The Poetry of Loss 167
Huda Shaarawi: A New Mentor and
Her Salon for Women 169
Rifa’a Rafic al-Tahtawi: The Extraction of Gold
or an Overview of Paris 170
Muhammad cAbduh: The Theology of Unity 171
Namik Kemal: Extract from the Journal Hurriyet 173
The Supplementary Fundamental Law o f 7 October 1907
Suggested Readings 177
Pa r t
Chapter 11
State-Building by Decree
Chapter 12
State-Building by Revolution and Conquest
Chapter 13
The Introduction and Spread o f Nationalism
Chapter 14
The Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute
Documents 227
Resolution of the Syrian General Congress at
Damascus, 2 July 1919 227
Contents vii
Theodor Herzl: A Solution of the Jewish Question
The Balfour Declaration 2 November 1917 230
Mahmud Darwish: Eleven Planets in
the Last Andalusian Sky 230
Suggested Readings 231
Part IV
Chapter 15
State and Society in the Contemporary
Middle East: An Old/New Relationship
Chapter 16
Chapter 17
The United States and the Middle East
Chapter 18
Israel, the Arab States, and the Palestinians
Chapter 19
The Iranian Revolution
Chapter 20
Political Islam
The Middle East in the “Age of Globalization”
Documents 327
Speech Delivered by President Gamal cAbd al-Nasser at
Port-Said on the Occasion o f Victory Day on
23 December 1961 327
Zakaria Tamer: Tigers on the Tenth Day 328
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 330
cAli Shari’ati: The Philosophy of History:
The Story of Cain and Abel 331
Ayatollah Khomeini: Islamic Government 333
Sayyid Qutb: Milestones 334
Suggested Readings 337
From Nadir to Zenith 20
The Battle of Kosovo 28
Coffee 40
Slaves, Opium, and the Course of World Trade
The Siege of Vienna Made Palatable 48
Provoking a Global War 53
“What Hath God Wrought” 80
Stranger Than Fiction 181
Sweaters, Sleeves, and the Crimean War 185
Drawing Boundaries 193
A Joke 254
From Basra, Iraq to Mecca, California 268
The Making of a Revolutionary Symbol 300
Islamism—or Fundamentalism? 313
The Middle East in Late Antiquity 12
The Islamic World at the Time of Muhammad 16
Islamic Conquests to 750 17
Gunpowder Empires, 1700 31
The Ottoman Empire, 1774-1915 50
The Ottoman Empire, 1798-1914 55
Qajar Persia, 1800-1914 86
The Middle East, 1923 203
Palestine and the Middle East 218
Israel/Palestine, 1921,1948 225
Israel and the Occupied Territories after 1967 286
very book is a group effort, mine no less than anyone elses. I would therefore
like to use this space to thank those whose assistance has been invaluable to me.
First off, there are my former professors, particularly J. C. Hurewitz at Columbia and
Zachary Lockman at Harvard, who showed me how it should be done. As the old
saying goes, we stand on the shoulders of giants. Others gave direct encouragement,
argued, offered advice and solace, and pointed out missteps: Najwa Al-Qattan, David
Dean Commins, Michael Cooperson, Howard Eissenstat, Katherine E. Fleming,
Carol Hakim, Dina Rizk Khoury, Roya Klaidman, Ussama Makdisi, Karla Mallette,
Chase Robinson, and Stefan Weber. Special thanks go to William L. Cleveland, a true
gentleman and friend, and to Teo Ruiz at UCLA and Helen Sader at the‘American
University of Beirut, who provided me with the time and support necessary to write
this book. T. M. Rollins of the Teaching Company inspired me to begin this project;
Bruce D. Borland took an early interest in the manuscript and sold Oxford University
Press on the idea; and Peter Coveney, my initial editor at Oxford University Press,
saw the first edition of this book through to publication, with the assistance of his
committed staff. Many of the photographs in this book came from the private collec­
tion of Wolf-Dieter Lemke of the Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenlandischen
Gesellschaft in Beirut and the Fondation Arabe pour l’image, also in Beirut. I am
grateful to Sara Scalenghe for apprising me of the latter resource, and Tamara Sawiya
for walking me through its extensive collection.
Finally, there are the students I taught at Harvard University; Boston College;
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the University of California, Los Angeles; and
the American University of Beirut who, over the years, forced me to distill the narra­
tive and rethink many of the issues raised in this book. It is to them that I dedicate it
It has been almost eight years since I wrote the acknowledgments that you, a mem­
ber of an obviously devoted (but select) group, have just read. In the intervening
period, I have had time to rethink some of the arguments I made in the previous
two editions of the book and to correct what I generously referred to as “mis­
steps” in the first paragraph of my earlier acknowledgments. I have been assisted
in this process by a number of friends, colleagues, and students, some of whom I
know well, some of whom are e-mail acquaintances. Among them are Joel Beinin,
Ian Belcher, Matthew S. Hopper, Fred Lawson, Issam Nassar, William B. Quandt,
Sarah Shields, and the reviewers for the third edition: Farid Al-Salim, Kansas State
University; Tom Ewing, Virginia Tech; Roberto Mazza, Western Illinois University;
James Meyer, Montana State University; Shane Minkin, Swarthmore College; and
Tamir Sorek, University of Florida. To all of them I extend my gratitude. An author
has no better friend than a careful reader.
n this book I have tried to keep the number of foreign words—particularly
words borrowed from Arabic, Persian, and Turkish—to a minimum. To a large
degree I think I have succeeded, although, to paraphrase Sigmund Freud, some­
times a timar is just a timar. Although Arabic in particular contains sounds that
do not exist in English (and vice versa), most words readers will confront should
pose no problems in terms of pronunciation.
There are two sounds, however, that are represented in English by symbols
that will appear strange to the average reader: the hamza (represented b y ‘) and
the ayn (represented b y c). The hamza designates what linguists call a glottal stop,
the sort of sound one associates with Cockney English, as in “alio, guvner!” Thus,
when used in the middle of a word, it indicates a breaking off, then a resumption
of sound. The ayn is a sound produced when the muscles of the throat are con­
stricted as a vowel is pronounced. While it may be difficult for someone who does
not speak Arabic to hear the difference between camal and amal, for example, the
absence of the ayn in the latter word alters its meaning significantly, transforming
“work” into “hope.”
The Introduction and Parts III and IV have been extensively revised and
Chapter 20, “Political Islam,” has been entirely rewritten.
Three new vignettes are included: “What God Hath Wrought” (Chapter 5),
Stranger Than Fiction (Part III), and From Basra, Iraq to Mecca, California
(Chapter 17).
The Photo Essay has been entirely revamped and expanded.
Additional photos have been added to the text.
Two new document selections, from Evliya Chelebi: Seyahatatiame, are pro­
vided in Part I.
The Suggested Readings sections of Parts II and IV have been revised.
The Timeline has been revised and updated.
9/11 in Historical Perspective
n 11 September 2001, two hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade
Center in New York City, killing 2,752 people. Another plane crashed into
the Pentagon Building in Washington, D.C., killing 184. A fourth, possibly headed
for the White House or the Capitol, crashed in rural Pennsylvania, killing all
Soon thereafter, President George W. Bush declared a global war on ter­
ror, targeting the mastermind of the crime, Osama bin Laden. American troops
entered Afghanistan to destroy bin Laden’s support network and associates there
and to kill or capture bin Laden. They deposed the government of Afghanistan,
which was controlled by a militant Islamic group, the Taliban, and hunted opera­
tives of al-Qaeda, bin Laden’s terrorist organization, which had found sanctuary in
that country. Then, in the spring o f2003, the United States opened up a new front
in the war on terror—Iraq. Although no substantive links between bin Laden or
al-Qaeda and the government of Iraq have ever been established, one of the oftrepeated rationales for going to war in Iraq was, in the words of George W. Bush,
that it is “better to fight the terrorists over there than over here.” The statistics
from the war on terror are grim. As of this writing, over five thousand American
soldiers have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan; estimates of Afghan civilian and
noncivilian casualties run between fifty thousand and 650,000; and estimates of
Iraqi civilian casualties range from approximately one hundred thousand to over
one million. From 2001 through 20p9, Congress appropriated almost a trillion
dollars to pay for costs associated with waging the two campaigns, and one highly
regarded study estimates that the Iraq war alone will end up costing American
taxpayers more than three trillion dollars. Adding insult to injury, at the moment
bin Laden still remains at large.
As anyone who watches the news or reads a newspaper knows, this is a period
of extraordinary turmoil in the Middle East. Those policy makers who had argued
for the overthrow of the government of Iraq believed th at the invasion would be a
cakewalk and that the United States could quickly transform Iraq into a regional
model of democracy. The facts tell a different story. Although “Operation Iraqi
Freedom” proved successful in toppling the Iraqi government, the postwar occu­
pation floundered as a result of poor planning and inadequate manpower and
preparation. By the spring of 2004 coalition forces found themselves first con­
fronting a reinvigorated insurgency, then sectarian violence. After a troop surge in
2007, concentrated in Baghdad, violence did diminish, but skeptics argue that the
troop surge and new tactics were only half the story, at best. The other half was the
ongoing ethnic cleansing in the city, which separated communities and emptied
neighborhoods of their inhabitants, and the “standing down” of the largest militia
in the country—neither of which bodes well for the future unity and stability of
Iraq. In the meantime, disputes over the distribution of oil revenue, provincial
boundaries and autonomy, and the power of the central government, make Iraq
more a model of brittleness than a model of democracy to be emulated.
Similar problems dog Afghanistan. After its initial rout, the Taliban regrouped
to battle rival warlords and NATO troops for power. It also has battled for con­
trol over the 92 percent of the worlds supply of illicit opium now produced in
Afghanistan (up from 75 percent in 2001), which the Taliban and its rivals use
to finance their military operations. And although elections have been held, one
would be hard pressed to decide which was more corrupt and fraud-riddled: the
2009 election for the president of Afghanistan or the 2009 election for the presi­
dent of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
There has been turmoil as well outside the main arena of the war on terror.
In 1993, Israelis and Palestinians agreed to hammer out their differences through
face-to-face diplomacy. When that effort failed, the Israeli government decided
that it might end the fifty-year Israeli-Palestinian conflict by constructing a wall
(literally) between Israelis and Palestinians, withdrawing from some occupied
land, and setting Israel’s boundaries unilaterally. By the summer of 2006, tensions
between Israel and Islamic groups to both the north and south escalated into all-out
war. It soon became apparent that neither a negotiated settlement nor an imposed
one would be imminent. Then there is Iran: After eight years under a reformist
government that had promised democratization at home and moderation in inter­
national affairs, the political tide shifted. A new government came to power which
resurrected the slogans from the revolutionary era, pursued the enrichment of
uranium in defiance of the international community, and began projecting Iranian
influence throughout the region. And far from being the panacea for American
woes in the Middle East, elections, such as those held in Palestine, Algeria, and
Egypt, have only demonstrated the popular appeal of Islamic parties. How are
these phenomena to be explained?
The argument of this book is twofold: First, the only way to understand con­
temporary events is to understand the history of the region that has become the
focus of so much attention. Specifically, this book argues that recent events cannot
be understood unless one understands the social, economic, cultural, and political
evolution of the Middle East, particularly during the modern period—the period
that began in the eighteenth century but has roots that stretch back as far as the
sixteenth. Second, this book contends that the Middle East does not stand out­
side global history, that the social, economic, cultural, and political evolution of
the region parallels (but does not necessarily duplicate) developments in other
regions of the world, and that therefore events in the Middle East cannot fully be
understood unless placed within their international context. To put it another way,
historians specializing in the Middle East certainly have a story to tell, but it is a
global story told in a local vernacular.
Although these two propositions would appear to be self-evident, a num­
ber of scholars, politicians, and pundits have offered alternative explanations for
contemporary events. Some have conjured up something they call an “Islamic
civilization,” whose main characteristic seems to be an implacable hatred toward
the West and modernity. Perhaps the most famous advocate of this position was
Samuel P. Huntington, professor of government at Harvard University. According
to Huntington, the world is divided into a number of distinct civilizations which
are irreconcilable because they hold to entirely different value systems. Islamic civ­
ilization, Huntington asserted, is particularly dangerous because of its propensity
for violence (Islam, in Huntingtons words, has “bloody borders”). For Huntington
and his disciples, the dramatic events of 11 September offer proof positive that
Western and Islamic civilizations are doomed to engage in a fight to the death.
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis found a wide audience in the aftermath of 9/11. Nevertheless, it is open to criticism on a number of grounds. First,
Huntington fails to take into account the diversity of the Islamic world. There
are, after all, numerous ways Muslims practice their Islam, and there are numer­
ous cultures with which Islam has interacted. This brings us to the second prob­
lem with Huntingtons thesis: Cultures are not billiard balls that bounce off each
other when they come into contact. Throughout history, cultures have borrowed
from and influenced each other. During the Middle Ages, for example, Arab phi­
losophers kept alive ancient Greek texts that later provided the foundation for the
European Renaissance. Interactions such as this make one despair of ever drawing
distinct boundaries for any “culture” or “civilization”—which is why many scholars
have abandoned those concepts entirely. Finally, Huntingtons thesis is ahistorical.
For Huntington and his disciples, the values of Islamic civilization are unchanging
and are spelled out in the foundational texts of Islam (such as the Qur’an). But why
are we to assume that the meaning and social function of Islam have not changed
over time as circumstances have changed? Why are we to assume that a Muslim of
the twenty-first century would approach those foundational texts in the same way
as a Muslim of the seventh century?
One of the more practical critiques of Huntington’s thesis has come, believe it
or not, from American presidents and policy makers attempting to come to terms
with the post-9/11 world. As George W. Bush stated on a number of occasions,
and as Barack Obama reiterated in 2009 in his Cairo speech to the Muslim world,
Americas problem is not with Islam per se. If that wer$ the case, America’s pur­
ported goal in the Middle East of promoting democracy and freedom—two values
they deem universal—would be futile. Instead, it has been asserted that America’s
problem is with a radical interpretation of Islam—what Bush and his supporters
saddled with the unfortunate label “Islamo-fascism,” and what the Obama admin­
istration has termed, with a touch of redundancy, “violent extremism” The real
Islam, they publicly conten …
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