Watch film: Smith Goes to Washington (1939), or Divergent (2014)Write a two page response, 650 words count to one of the following two questions. In your response, use *at least* one direct quotation from either Aristotle or Plato to support your answer. Write in 12-point font, Times New Roman, double-spaced, with one-inch margins. Submit in ONLY .doc, .docx, or .pdf formats.Aristotle file is here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K0ujI9L4sTv93ILPe…Plato file attached in file.Choose ONE prompt here: Either1) Would Aristotle think that Mr. Smith is a good citizen? That is, does Mr. Smith display the kind of political virtues Aristotle thinks are important and necessary for a well-functioning political community? If so, describe at least two ways Mr. Smith is a good representation of Aristotle’s ideal citizen. If not, describe at least two reasons why Mr. Smith would fall short in Aristotle’s estimation.*OR*2) The political message of Divergent clearly opposes the kind of rigid social hierarchies and class system Tris defies. However, Plato endorses a political system built on similarly rigid social hierarchies as the most-just kind of political order. Does the system on display in the film embody his vision of the ideal-city ruled by the Wise? If so, describe how this system ensures “Justice” as Plato understands it. If not, explain how the political system described in the film does not ensure “Justice” as Plato understands it.
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Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by
C. D. C. REEVE
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Republic / translated from the new standard Greek text, with
introduction, by C.D.C. Reeve.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-87220-737-4 (hardcover) — ISBN 0-87220-736-6 (pbk.)
1. Political science—Early works to 1800. 2 Utopias. I. Reeve, C.D.C.,
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S OCRATES ’ NARRATION CONTINUES : When I had said this, I
thought I had done with the discussion. But it all turned out to be only a prelude, as it were. You see, Glaucon, who is always very courageous in everything, refused on this occasion, too, to accept Thrasymachus’ capitulation.
Instead, he said:
Do you want to seem to have persuaded us, Socrates, that it is better in
every way to be just rather than unjust, or do you want to really persuade us
SOCRATES: I want to really persuade you, if I can.
GLAUCON: Well, then, you certainly are not doing what you want. Tell
me, do you think there is a sort of good we welcome, not because we
desire its consequences, but because we welcome it for its own sake—
enjoying, for example, and all the harmless pleasures from which nothing
results afterward beyond enjoying having them?
SOCRATES: Certainly, I think there is such a thing.
GLAUCON: And is there a sort of good we love for its own sake, and also
for the sake of its consequences—knowing, for example, and seeing, and
being healthy? For we welcome such things, I imagine, on both counts.
GLAUCON: And do you also recognize a third kind of good, such as physical training, medical treatment when sick, medicine itself, or ways of making money generally? We would say that these are burdensome but
beneﬁcial to us, and we would not choose them for their own sake, but for
the sake of their rewards and other consequences.
SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, there is also this third kind. But what of it?
GLAUCON: In which of them do you place justice?
SOCRATES: I myself put it in the ﬁnest one—the one that anyone who is
going to be blessed with happiness must love both because of itself and
because of its consequences.
GLAUCON: That is not what the masses think. On the contrary, they think
it is of the burdensome kind: the one that must be practiced for the sake of
the rewards and the popularity that are the consequences of a good reputation, but that is to be avoided as intrinsically burdensome.
How to Defend Justice
SOCRATES: I know that is the general view. Thrasymachus has been faulting justice and praising injustice on these grounds for some time. But it
seems that I am a slow learner.
GLAUCON: Come on, then, listen to what I have to say as well, and see
whether you still have that problem.You see, I think Thrasymachus gave up
before he had to, as if he were a snake you had charmed.Yet, to my way of
thinking, there was still no demonstration on either side. For I want to hear
what justice and injustice are, and what power each has when it is just by
itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account the rewards and the consequences of each of them.
So, if you agree, I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus. First, I
will state what sort of thing people consider justice to be, and what its origins are. Second, I will argue that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as
something necessary, not as something good. Third, I will argue that they
have good reason to act as they do. For the life of the unjust person is, they
say, much better than that of the just one.
It isn’t, Socrates, that I believe any of that myself. I am perplexed,
indeed, and my ears are deafened listening to Thrasymachus and countless
others. But I have yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want, as
being better than injustice. I want to hear it praised on its own, and I think
that I am most likely to learn this from you. That is why I am going to
speak at length in praise of the unjust life: by doing so, I will be showing
you the way I want to hear you praising justice and denouncing injustice.
But see whether you want me to do what I am saying or not.
SOCRATES: I want it most of all. Indeed, what subject could a person with
any sense enjoy talking and hearing about more often?
GLAUCON: Excellent sentiments. Now, listen to what I said I was going to
discuss ﬁrst—what justice is like and what its origins are. People say, you
see, that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad. But the
badness of suffering it far exceeds the goodness of doing it. Hence, those
who have done and suffered injustice and who have tasted both—the ones
who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it—decide that it is proﬁtable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor
to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants; and what
the law commands, they call lawful and just. That, they say, is the origin
and very being1 of justice. It is in between the best and the worst. The best
is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two
extremes. People love it, not because it is a good thing, but because they are
too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power to do
See Glossary of Terms s.v. being.
it, however—someone who is a real man—would not make an agreement
with anyone, neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. For him, that would be
insanity. That is the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates,
and those are its natural origins.
We can see most clearly that those who practice it do so unwillingly,
because they lack the power to do injustice, if we imagine the following
thought-experiment. Suppose we grant to the just and the unjust person
the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and
see where their appetites would lead. And we will catch the just person redhanded, traveling the same road as the unjust one. The reason for this is the
desire to do better2 than others. This is what every natural being naturally
pursues as good. But by law and force, it is made to deviate from this path
and honor equality.
They would especially have the freedom I am talking about if they had
the power that the ancestor of Gyges of Lydia is said to have possessed.3 The
story goes that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia. There
was a violent thunderstorm, and an earthquake broke open the ground and
created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he
was ﬁlled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to
many other amazing things of which we are told stories, he saw a hollow,
bronze horse. There were windowlike openings in it and, peeping in, he
saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing but a gold ring on its ﬁnger. He took off the ring and came out of the
chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting of shepherds that
reported to the king on the state of the ﬂocks. And as he was sitting among
the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring toward himself,
toward the inside of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to
those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He was
amazed at this and, ﬁngering the ring, he turned the setting outward again
and became visible. So, he experimented with the ring to test whether it
indeed had this power—and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he
became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. As soon
as he realized this, he arranged to become one of the messengers sent to
report to the king. On arriving there, he seduced the king’s wife, attacked
the king with her help, killed him, and in this way took over the kingdom.
Let’s suppose, then, that there were two such rings, one worn by the
just person, the other by the unjust. Now no one, it seems, would be so
incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice, or bring himself to
keep away from other people’s possessions and not touch them, when he
could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go
See Glossary of Terms s.v. do better.
At 612b4, the ring is assigned to Gyges himself, not his ancestor.
How to Defend Justice
into people’s houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release
from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would
make him like a god among humans. And in so behaving, he would do no
differently than the unjust person, but both would pursue the same course.
This, some would say, is strong evidence that no one is just willingly, but
only when compelled. No one believes justice to be a good thing when it
is kept private, since whenever either person thinks he can do injustice
with impunity, he does it. Indeed, all men believe that injustice is far more
proﬁtable to themselves than is justice. And what they believe is true, so the
exponent of this argument will say. For someone who did not want to do
injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who did not touch other people’s property, would be thought most wretched and most foolish by everyone aware of the situation. Though, of course, they would praise him in
public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for my
As for decision itself about the life of the two we are discussing, if we
contrast the extremes of justice and injustice, we shall be able to make the
decision correctly; but if we don’t, we won’t. What, then, is the contrast I
have in mind? It is this: we will subtract nothing from the injustice of the
unjust person, and nothing from the justice of the just one. On the contrary, we will take each to be perfect in his own pursuit. First, then, let the
unjust person act like a clever craftsman. An eminent ship’s captain or doctor, for example, knows the difference between what his craft can and cannot do. He attempts the ﬁrst but lets the second go by. And if he happens to
slip, he can put things right. In the same way, if he is to be completely
unjust, let the unjust person correctly attempt unjust acts and remain undetected. The one who is caught should be thought inept. For the extreme of
injustice is to be believed to be just without actually being so. And our
completely unjust person must be given complete injustice—nothing must
be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for
justice. If he does happen to slip up, he must be able to put it right, either
through his ability to speak persuasively if any of his unjust activities are discovered, or to use force if force is needed, because he is courageous and
strong and has provided himself with wealth and friends.
Having hypothesized such a person, let’s now put the just man next to
him in our argument—someone who is simple and noble and who, as
Aeschylus says, does not want to be believed to be good, but to be so.4 We
must take away his reputation. For a reputation for justice would bring him
honor and rewards, so that it would not be clear whether he is being just
In Seven against Thebes 592–4, it is said of Amphiaraus that “he did not wish to be
believed to be the best but to be it.” The passage continues with the words Glaucon
quotes below at 362a–b.
for the sake of justice, or for the sake of those honors and rewards. We must
strip him of everything except justice, and make his situation the opposite
of the unjust person’s. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that he may be tested with regard to justice by seeing whether or not he can withstand a bad reputation and its consequences.
Let him stay like that, unchanged, until he is dead—just, but all his life
believed to be unjust. In this way, both will reach the extremes, the one of
justice and the other of injustice, and we will be able to judge which of
them is happier.
SOCRATES: Whew! My dear Glaucon, how vigorously you have scoured
each of the men in our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for
an art competition.
G LAUCON : I am doing the best I can. Since the two are as I have
described, in any case, it should not be difﬁcult to complete the account of
the sort of life that awaits each of them, but it must be done. And if what I
say sounds crude, Socrates, remember that it is not I who speak, but those
who praise injustice at the expense of justice. They will say that the just
person in such circumstances will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained,
blinded with a red-hot iron, and, at the end, when he has suffered every
sort of bad thing, he will be impaled, and will realize then that one should
not want to be just, but to be believed to be just. Indeed, Aeschylus’ words
are far more correctly applied to the unjust man. For people will say that it
is really the unjust person who does not want to be believed to be unjust,
but actually to be so, because he bases his practice on the truth about things
and does not allow reputation to regulate his life. He is the one who “harvests a deep furrow in his mind, where wise counsels propagate.” First, he
rules his city because of his reputation for justice. Next, he marries into any
family he wishes, gives his children in marriage to anyone he wishes, has
contracts and partnerships with anyone he wants, and, besides beneﬁting
himself in all these ways, he proﬁts because he has no scruples about doing
injustice. In any contest, public or private, he is the winner and does better
than his enemies. And by doing better than them, he becomes wealthy,
beneﬁts his friends, and harms his enemies. He makes adequate sacriﬁces to
the gods and sets up magniﬁcent offerings to them, and takes much better
care of the gods—and, indeed, of the human beings he favors—than the
just person. So he may reasonably expect that the gods, in turn, will love
him more than the just person. That is why they say, Socrates, that gods and
humans provide a better life for the unjust person than for the just one.
When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to respond, but his brother
You surely do not think that the argument has been adequately stated?
How Not to Defend Justice
SOCRATES: Why shouldn’t I?
ADEIMANTUS: The most important point has not been mentioned.
SOCRATES: Well, then, as the saying goes, a man’s brother must stand by
him.5 So if Glaucon has omitted something, you must help him. Though,
for my part at any rate, what he has already said is quite enough to throw
me to the canvas and make me incapable of coming to the aid of justice.
ADEIMANTUS: Nonsense. But listen to what more I have to say, as well.
You see, in order to clarify what Glaucon has in mind, we should also fully
explore the arguments that are opposed to the ones he gave—those that
praise justice and disparage injustice.
As you know, when fathers speak to their sons to give them advice, they
say that one must be just, as do all those who have others in their charge.
But they do not praise justice itself, only the good reputation it brings: the
inducement they offer is that if we are reputed to be just, then, as a result of
our reputation, we will get political ofﬁces, good marriages, and all the
things that Glaucon recently said that the just man would get as a result of
having a good reputation.
But these people have even more to say about the consequences of reputation. For by throwing in being well thought of by the gods, they have
plenty of good things to talk about—all the ones the gods are said to give to
those who are pious. For example, the noble Hesiod and Homer say such
things. For Hesiod says that the gods make the oak trees “bear acorns at the
top, bees in the middle, and ﬂeecy sheep heavy laden with wool” for those
who are just, and tells of many other good things akin to these. 6 And
Homer says pretty much the same:
When a good king, in his piety,
Upholds justice, the black earth bears
Wheat and barley for him, and his trees are heavy with fruit,
His sheep bear lambs unfailingly and the sea yields up its ﬁsh.7
Musaeus and his son claim that the gods give just people even more exciting goods than these. In their account, they lead the just to Hades, seat
them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown
them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking—as if
they thought eternal drunkenness was the ﬁnest wage of virtue. Others
stretch even further the wages that virtue receives from the gods. For they
say that someone who is pious and keeps his promises leaves his children’s
children and a whole race behind him.
See Homer, Odyssey 16.97–8.
Hesiod,Works and Days 332–3.
Homer, Odyssey 19.109.
In these and other similar ways, they praise justice. But the impious and
unjust they bury in mud in Hades, and they force them to carry water in a
sieve. They bring them into bad repute while they are still alive. And all
those penalties that Glaucon gave to just people who are thought to be
unjust, they give to the unjust ones. But they have nothing else to say.
That, then, is the praise and blame given to each. But in addition,
Socrates, there is another kind of argument about justice and injustice for
you to consider—one that is used both by private individuals and by poets.
With one voice they all chant the hymn that justice and temperance are
ﬁne things, but difﬁcult and onerous, while intemperance and injustice are
sweet and easy to acquire and are only shameful by repute and convention.
They also say that unjust deeds are, for the most part, more proﬁtable than
just ones; and whereas they are perfectly willing to bestow public and private honors on bad people—provided they have wealth and other types of
power—and to declare them to be happy, they dishonor and disregard those
who happen to be in any way weak or poor, even though they admit that
they are better than the others.
But most amazing of all are the accounts they give of the gods and virtue,
and how it is that the gods, too, assign misfortune and a bad life to many
good people, and the opposite fate to their opposites. Begging priests and
prophets go to the doors of rich people and persuade them that, through
sacriﬁces and incantations, they have acquired a god-given power: if the rich
person or any of his ancestors has committed an injustice, they can ﬁx it
with pleasant rituals. And if he wishes to injure an enemy, he will be able to
harm a just one or an unjust one alike at little cost, since by means of spells
and enchantments they can persuade the gods to do their bidding.
And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these accounts.
Some harp on the ease of vice, on the grounds that
Vice in abundance is easy to get,
The road is smooth and begins beside you,
But the gods have put s …
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